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Creditors and highly indebted countries alike would benefit
from a credit  market  in which  penalties  for default were  heavier
ormorecertain, in which  multinational  and  international  organi-
zations  were used to improve  the flow of information  about  the
debtor countries to possible creditors,  and in which methods
were designed  to increase  the precommitment  of funds.
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It is important to deal with the immediate debt  strictly enforceab'".  It should be possible,
crisis in ways that do not harm the credit market,  however, to improve incentives for developing
but efforts should be made to improve that  countries to repay future loans.
market.  The two chief problems limiting the
market for developing country credit are unen-  Specifically, Wakeman-Linn recommends:
forceable contracts and asymmetric information,
according to Wakeman-Linn.  * Finding ways to increase the penalties for
default, or making the penalties more certain.
Instead of undertaking investments that  This would increase the debtor countries'
could pay rates of return greater than the oppor-  willingness to pay, which woul  renefit all
tunity cost of their funds, creditors are financing  parties.
investments in projects with lower rates of return
but enforceable contracts.  *  Studying how to use existing multinational
and international organizations to increase the
Creditors and debtor countries alike would  flow of relevant information to potential credi-
benefit if some method could be found to make  tors.
loan contracts enforceable and to increase the
flow (and quality) of information  about the  *  Increasing precommitment of funds through
developing countries'  ability and willingness to  increased penalties for default and other ap-
repay loans (including their susceptibility to  proaches.  IMF contingency programs are
penalties) and about how they intend to use the  already used extensively to establish some form
loan proceeds.  of precommitment.  Further use of international
organizations along these lines may be possible.
Short of creating an international court  Mutually beneficial contracts are not currently
whose judgments are supported by an interna-  possible because precommitment is not enforce-
tional army - which is highly unlikely - there  able.
is no way to make contracts in this market
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References  41I.  Introduction
Governments regularly intervene in credit markets in an attempt
to  rectify market  failures.  The United  States government,  for
example, guarantees loans for students in an attempt to overcome
the  effects  of  the  legal  prohibition  against  using  the  asset
acquired  --  human  capital  --  as  collateral,  and  as  an
acknowledgement  of  the  externalities  in  education.  The
establishment of the U.S. Farm Credit System was a response to a
perceived failure of credit markets to adequately transfer "funds
from the surplus areas of the Northeast to the funds-short farming
regions  of the  West." 1 Governments  intervene  in home  mortgage
markets out of a belief that the market does not adequately address
issues of equity or internalize social benefits of home ownership.
The list of credit markets in which governments intervene as a
result of perceived or actual market failures is extensive.  There
is,  however,  at  least  one  important  credit  market  where
intervention of this type has  traditionally been  absent  --  the
market for developing country debt.
This lack of intervention is not due to a perception that this
market  suffers from no shortcomings; indeed, the shortcomings in
the market for developing country debt dwarf those in the mortgage
market, for example.  Rather, the lack of intervention is explained
both  by  uncertainty  as to what  types  of  intervention  would  be
lWebb  (1980) p.  19.  One  explanation  for this  geographic
irnobility of funds was the difficulty of communicating information
regarding opportunities and risk.3
desirable, and by uncertainty over who should intervene when one
of the  parties  to  the  loan  contract  is, either  implicitly  or
explicitly,  a national government  itself.  Clearly,  if there  is
going to be successful intervention in this market to correct its
shortcomings, and nct just intervention in some transactions  in
this market tc help individual banks or countries, the intervention
will have to be undertaken by some international agency.
The response to the developing country debt crisis of the 1980's
has removed one of the two areas of uncertainty mentioned above.
The World  Bank and  the  International Monetary  Fund are  clearly
recognized as the appropriate agencies for addressing problems in
this  market  .2 The  question  of  what  sort  of  intervention  is
desirable unfortunately still lacks a clear answer.
The issue of  appropriate intervention  really involves not one  but
two questions:  What should be done about the immediate crisis we
are  facing?  And  what  should  we  do  to  improve  the  future
functioning of this market?  A great deal has been written on the
first  question,  and  I  make  no effort  with  this  paper  to  shed
further light on that subject.
Providing insight into the second question --  how do we make the
market  for developing country debt function better,.  in the sense
of providing  Pareto  superior  outcomes  --  is the  focus  of  this
2For  example, according to Ernest Zedillo (1986), "Except for
a few cases, debt arrangements have been explicitly linked to the
design  of  and  compliance  with  Fund-supported  stabilization
programs.  It is not an exaggeration to say that...  the Fund has
regained  its  foremost  position  in  the  handling  of  problems
affecting global financial stability."  (p. 132)4
paper.  Specifically,  in this paper  I  attempt  to  describe  the
nature of the various shortcomings in this market and explain in
detail  the  implications  of  each  of  these  failures  for  loan
quantities, interest rates,-maturities, investment, utility, etc.
Much- existing  work,  designed  primarily  to  focus  on  other
questions-,  nonetheless sheds light on the questions central to this
paper.  Thus part of the task of this paper is simply to synthesize
the insights of these various authors.  Since, however,  none of
these works analyzes the general implications of the shortcomings
in this market, there are substantial gaps in these insights.  Thus
the major task of this paper is to add to the known implications
of these shortcomings with findings of my own, present all this as
one coherent story and prove mathematically that all the assertions
are correct and mutually consistent.
It  is  worth  noting  that,  while  academic  economists  clearly
recognize the importance of the shortcomings in this market, as is
made clear in the discussion  of numerous works below,  it is not
clear that all economic policy makers have yet to recognize this
importance.  Thus  some  policy  makers  show  little  concern  for
addressing the weaknesses inherent in this market.  Three examples
will highlight this point.
First, Manuel Johnson, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, in  discussing the international debt
crisis, said  "there is broad  consensus that we have  a...problem
because...borrowers  and  lenders  agreed  to  loans  that  appeared
rational..  .These loans turned out to be problems when real interest5
rates  shifted  sharply upward  at  the  same  time  export  revenues
...became substantially less than anticipated."  (Johnson, 1987,
p. 3).  His further discussion of what is  needed for resolving this
erisis'-says  nothing about-improving the functioning of the market
itself.  :
*Second,  in  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Annual Report for
1987, Frydl and Sobol argue that managing the LDC debt problem has
"two major and interrelated-goals: (1)  to improve LDC economic and
financial performance  with a  view toward sustaining economic growth
and-..  restoring-..  creditworthiness...  and  (2)  to  reduce  the
vulnerability of the international banking system to risk on LDC
loans." (Frydl  and Sobol, 1987, p. 6).  No mention is made by them
of any need to improve the functioning of the market itself.
Finally,  Gerald  Corrigan  (1988), President  of  the  New  York
Federal  Reserve  Bank,  listed  what  he  believes  are  the  five
requirements for success in dealing with the debt problem; none of
his requirements involve addressing market shortcomings.
Thus at least as far as some important members of the Federal
Reserve  System  are  concerned,  the  significance  of the  problems
discussed below are either not recognized or not acknowledged.  The
objective, therefore, of this paper is to describe carefully the
significance of these market shortcomings for the participants and
others concerned.
In Section II, I deal with the main problem in this market  --
the unenforceability of contracts.  The nature and extent of the
problem is  described.. The limited  ability of creditors to overcome6
the problem is  discussed.  Finally, the implications of the problem
for loan quantities, interir.st  rates, maturity structures, and the
nature of economic activity in  the borrowing country are described.
One.  important  result  presented  in  this  section  is  that
unenforceability  can explain the perverse timing of credit flows
to developing countries; i.e. the fact that loans flow into these
countries during high  income periods, and out during  low income
periods.
In Section  III,  I undertake  the same  analysis  regarding the
problem  of  asymmetric  information.  Here,  however,  we  must  be
careful to distinguish the nature of the information about which
there  is asymmetry.  Thus  I  analyze  the  effects  of  asymmetric
information regarding ability to pay, willingness to pay and use
of the loan proceeds.
In Section IV I combine the findings of the previous sections,
highlighting the general implications of the market shortcomings,
and draw some tentative conclusions regarding the nature of optimal
interventions in this market.  Finally, in the Appendix, I present
a model which  I use to prove the accuracy and consistency of the
various arguments --  both those culled from other authors and those
new  observations  --  presented  in this  paper.
II.  UNENFORCEABILITY
IZI.a. The Nature of the Problem
Developing  countries borrow  for several reasons; according to
Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1982),  there  are  four  primary  reasonsr
7
countries borrow:  to smooth consumption  relative to income, to
invest if returns domestically exceed the world cost of funds, to
facilitate international transactions and, on a temporary basis,
to ease transition  to a permanent shock.  These-  motives are not
unlike the motives for borrowers in many other credit markets.
However, as indicated above, the market for developing country
debt is different from the market for other debt for several major
reasons.  The most important of these differences is the fact that
the debt is unenforceable.
In most  credit markets,  if the borrower  refuses  to pay,  the
lender can take the borrower to court.  A!;  long as the borrower is
solvent, the courts will force payment of the debc, even  if the
borrower  must  liquidate  assets  to  do  so.  In  the  market  for
developing  country debt, however, such an option  does not exist
for creditors.
If a developing country defaults on a loan, there is no court
that has both the jurisdiction and the enforcement power to force
the developing country to pay the loan.  The implications of this
situation  for the LDC credit market are enormous.  Imagine, for
example, a mortgage market in which no court could force borrowers
to pay back their loan.
While  it is customary to do so, to state that these loans are
strictly "unenforceable" is actually stating the problem a bit too
strongly; creditors do have limited enforcement options.  As Bulow
and Rogoff  (1986) point out, creditor claims do have standing in
Western  courts.  Thus a  defaulting  country's  ships  and planes,8
goods and money in transit, and assets abroad may be subject to
seizure.  This potential seizure power does not, however, resolve
the unenforceability problem.
As Gersovitz  (1985) notes, while North Korea has-  serious debt
problems,  it still  successfully engages  in international trade.
When  it makes  payments, no effort  is made  to seize them in the
process of transition.  Indeed, only in the ca:;e  of Iran in 1979-
80, according  to Gersovitz, has any  attempt been made  to seize
assets abroad to pay debts. 3 Thus, for whatever reason, creditors
aren't using the limited enforcement powers they do have.
Hellwig  (1986)  provides a possible explanation for this failure
on  the part  of creditors  to use  their  enforcement  powers.  He
points out that the use of enforcement powers suffers from a time
consistency problem:  At the time the loan is made, the creditor
wants to threaten the most serious possible penalties in case of
default.  At the time of default, however, the creditor wants to
avoid taking the debtor to court; this would effectively  require
the creditor to write down the value of the debt on his books to
zero, a result which banks want to avoid.
Further,  even  if  these  "enforcement"  procedures  were  fully
utilized,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  this  would  make  the  loans
enforceable.  The penalty a country suffers from default may be
3Clearly, even  the case  of  Iran  is not a  demonstration  of
banks independently choosing to use existing enforcement powers to
collect  on  defaulted  debt.  Politics  and  political  pressure
presumably played a major role in causing banks to use enforcement
powers in this case.9
quite small relative to the debt owed.  As Bulow and Rogoff (1986)
observe, debtor countries can choose between paying the loan, not
paying  and incurring whatever costs are  imposed through  seizure
abrQad, or not paying and reverting to autarky (actually, in a  more
realistic  setting, this  last option would  be, after defaulting,
trading only with countries who wil'l  make no attempts  :"  enforce
outstanding debt claims).
Nordhaus  (1986) points  out  that  countries  have  yet  another
option.  Becal'se  in equilibrium the borrower will be relatively
indifferent between defaulting and paying, while the lender will
be very concerned that the loan is repaid, borrowers can use this
leverage to negotiate a partial default.  Nordhaus argues that the
incentives are such that we-  should never see a complete default;
it seems to me that the incentives are such that complete repayment
of a loan  is also unlikely.  Lomax  (1986) points  out that  this
potential for partial default is somewhat constrained by the fact
that banking laws prevent creditors from making  concessions that
depart too much from normal commercial terms.
Could collateral requirements  help resolve this unenforceability
problem?  Even  if,  as  mentioned  above,  mortgages  were
unenforceable,  if creditors  ':.iuld  effectively  use  the house  as
collateral the loan would be virtually enforceable.  Could the same
solution work in the market for developing country debt?
Unfortunately,  the  answer  is  no.  As  Eaton,  Gersovitz  and
Stiglitz  (1986) point out, there is no credible opportunity  for
providing collateral in  this market.  Collateral held in  the debtor10
country carnot be seized in the case of default; collateral held
abroad is of  lo  value to the borrower, so the portion of a  loan
which is collateralized is of no value to the borrower.
Thus, as Eaton and Gersovitz  (1982) argue, any loan agreement
must  be  what  they  refer  to  as  time  consistent,  or  incentive
compatible.  It muast  be the case that after the loan is made, it
is still  in the  interest of the borrower to pay the  loan back.
More  precisely,  at  the time  the  loan  is made,  the  lender must
believe that after the loan proceeds have been dispersed  it will
remain in the interest of the borrower to repay the loan.
Indeed, as Gersovitz (1985)  points out, the enforcement problem
is the key problem with regard to repayment of developing country
debt.  He notes that  there are only three possible  reasons for
payment difficulties with any loan:  either the borrower lacks the
resources  to  repay,  or  the borrower  has  a  temporary  liquidity
problem, or the borrower simply refuses to repay.
In the market for developing country debt, the first problem --
solvency --  is irrelevant.  Gersovitz (1985) and Eaton, Gersovitz
and  Stiglitz  (1986) argue  that  countries  virtually  always  have
sufficient  resources  to  repay  their  loans;  their  net  worth  is
positive. 4
4This  may not be true for what Mohammed  (1986) refers to as
the  "official borrowers"  of sub-Saharan Africa.  However, since
this paper is focusing on the market  for developing country debt,
the borrowers we are concerned about are those Mohammed refers to
as "market borrowers".11
Temiorary liquidity problems should not cause payment problems
either,  so  long  as  the  problem  is  correctly  perceived  by  the
creditors.  Creditors in this case would simply make additional
temporary loans to overcome the temporary liquidity problem.
Thus it is only if  the country is  unwilling to repay the loan (or
is perceived to be unwilling to repay the loan) that we will have
a payments problem.  Creditors must take care to design contracts
borrowers have an incentive to honor.  We now turn to a discussion
of  the  impact  of  this  unenforceability  problem  on  the  loan
participants and the nature of the loan agreement.
II.b. Impact on the Loan Participants and the Loan Contract
The  most important  observation  pertaining to  the unenforceability
of these loans is that it unambiguously reduces the utility of the
participants to this loan contract.  As Guesnerie (1986)  points out
"commitment is always in a sense preferable to noncommitment...the
noncommitment optimal contract can always  (at least) be mimicked
under commitment"  (p; 518).  Any contract that could be attained
when  commitment  is  not  possible  could  also  be  attained  when
commitment is  possible, simply by having borrower and lender agree
to act as if commitment isn't possible.  The reverse is not true;
many contracts that can be agreed upon with commitment cannot be
agreed upon in the absence of commitment.
Cohen and Sachs (1986)  make this more specific by demonstrating
that, when repudiation of debt is  possible due to unenforceability,
the maximum rate of growth the country can achieve is less than12
when the debt is enforceable.  Indeed, Eaton and Gersovitz  (1982)
observe that an increase in penalties for default in this market
may actually increase the welfare of borrowing countries by making
repudiation  less likely. 5 And,  as Swoboda  (1985) notes,  as the
market  is currently  structured,  borrowers  cannot  surrender the
option of repudiation; effective and credible precommitment is not
possible.
How does this decline in welfare and growth come about?  To see
this,  we  need  to  *understand  the  specific  effects  the
unenforceability has on the loan contract.
Krugman  (1985) has  likened the market  for developing  country
debt to the general credit market described by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).  Kletzer (1986)  has drawn comparisons between this market
and both the credit  market discussed5  by Stiglitz and Weiss and that
described by Jaffee and Russell (1976). In  both the Stiglitz-Weiss
and the Jaffee-Russell notions of credit markets, the possibility
of default results in  endogenous equilibrium credit rationing.  The
total volume of loans is lower as a result of the possibility of
Borrowers would benefit from the increased penalties on new
debt due to the lower interest rates and higher  loan quantities
available  as  a  result  of  the  reduced  probability  of  default.
Obviously,  if penalties  for existing debt were  increased and all
else was unchanged, borrowers would be worse off.  But the Eaton
and Gersovitz (1982) finding implies that a negotiated increase in
default penalties  and  loan volume,  and a  reduction  in interest
rates, may also be a mutually beneficial way to deal with existing
debt.13
default. 6
This decline in loan volume is not at all surprising.  When the
possibility of .epudiation exists, as loan size increases, unless
the potential  cost of repudiation increases at least dollar for
dollar, the-probability of repudiation increases.  The penalties,
such as they are,  that I have described  for repudiation  in the
market for developing country debt are unlikely to increase dollar
for dollar with loan size.
In a world  of certainty, there would be some _oan size above
which  repudiation  is the preferred  option  for borrowers;  loans
would  never  exceed  that  amount.  In  the  real  world,  with
uncertainty, the probability that repudiation  will be the preferred
option  for borrowers,  at some point  in the future, increases as
loan size increases.- Thus creditors, concerned about keeping the
probability of repudiation low, will have an incentive to keep loan
size low.
The impact  of unenforceability on interest rates is  even clearer.
Since  lenders have  the  option  of  making  risk-free  loans  (e.g.
United States Treasury bonds or bills), they will only make these
risky  developing  country  loans  if the  rate  on  these  loans  is
sufficiently greater than the rate on risk-free loans.  Thus the
6In  Jaffee  and  Russell  (1976),  each  borrower  receives  a
smaller loan as a result of the default probability then he would
receive in absence of this default probability.  In Stiglitz and
Weiss  (1981), some borrowers receive as much as they would have
otherwise, while other borrowers receive none.  However, Wakeman-
Linn  (1988) describes a variant on the Stiglitz-Weiss  notion of
credit rationing  in which all borrowers receive some credit, but
less than they would receive if the default probability was zero.14
possibility of repudiation increases the rate these countries must
pay.7
The unenforceability problem also affects the maturity structure
of the debt.  According-  to Guttentag  and Herring  (1983), "debt
repayment  schedules  are  related  less  to  the  capacity  of  the
borrower  to repay than  to the need to  influence the borrower's
willingness to repay" (p. 217).
According to Kletzer (1986)  maturities are shortened as a way of
attaining  enforcement  power  over  some  contract  provisions.  By
requiring frequent renegotiations of the contract, the lender  hopes
to influence the borrower to use the funds in line with  implicit
or explicit contract provisions.
Gersovitz  (1985) points out that, due to the unenforceability
problem,  individual  creditors  prefer  shorter  maturities,  to
facilitate their withdrawal  from the market,  should that become
desirable.
Thus  "loan maturities  tend to be  shorter than those  that are
optimal from the standpoint of repayment capacity" (Guttentag and
Herring, 1983, p. 217).
We  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of  the  effects  that
unenforceability  has on economic activity in the debtor country,
particularly  its effect on the level of investment.  The earlier
7It  can  easily  be  shown  in the  Jaffee-Russell  model  that
interest rates are increasing in  default probability.  It can also
be shown that,  in the Stiglitz-Weiss model,  interest rates when
there is some positive probability of default are higher than when
there is no probability of default.15
observation  of  Cohen  and  Sachs  (1986),  that  unenforceability
reduces  growth  rates,  would  lead  us  to  suspect  that
unenforceability  lowers  investment; we will see below  that this
conclusion  is correct.  :  -
I have already shown that unenforceability lowers the volume of
loans available to a country; thus all activities which would have
been  financed  with  that  additional  credit  cannot  be  financed.
Almost  certainly  some  of  these  marginal  activities  would  be
investment activities.
Further, the increase in interest rates reduces investment.  Any
investment activities that pay an expected rate of return somewhere
between the risk-free rate and the rate the debtor country has to
pay are activities that will not be financed at this higher rate,
but would have been  financed at the lower rate.8 Thus both the
impact on loan quantity and the impact on interest rates tend to
reduce the level of investment.
However, Atkeson  (1988) argues that the optimal contract with
unenforceability (and  asymmetric information about use of the loan
8This argument assumes  the debtor  country,  at the  time  it
takes out the loan and uses the proceeds, intends to repay the loan
or  has  the  same  expectations  as  the  lender  regarding  the
probability  of default.  If the debtor  intends not to repay the
loan  in full,  or has  different  expectations  than  the  creditor
regarding the probability of default, the effective interest rate
the debtor  faces may be  less than the  risk  free rate.  It can
easily be demonstrated in a model like those in the Appendix that,
even  in this case,  investment would  decline.  Facing  a binding
credit ceiling, investment is determined not by the interest rate
on loans.  Rather, the level of investment is chosen to equate the
marginal product of capital with the ratio of marginal utility of
consumption across time periods.  The declining loan volume will
reduce investment.16
proceeds) is one which calls for a net outflow of funds in times
of low income; he shows in his model  that such a  contract will
increase investmenit  and reduce risk to the lender.
Atkeson's  finding,  that  the  optimal  contract  increases
investment, hinges crucially on the fact that there  is ornly  one
type  of  potential  investment  for borrowers  in his  model.  As
Gersovitz  (1985) points out, in a market with unenforceable debt
it is generally not clear that lenders will gain, in the form of
reduced risk,  from borrower investment.  If borrowers  invest in
export  oriented  industries,  or  other  areas  which  increase  the
borrower's susceptibility to penalties, risk falls and lenders are
better  off.  But  if,  for  example,  lenders  invest  in  import-
competing  industries  or  foreign  exchange,  this  reduces  the
borrower's  susceptibility to penalties and makes creditors worse
off.
Since  lenders have  no  effective  way  of binding  borrowers  in
advance  to  a  particular  type  of  investment,  lenders  have  no
incentive  to  design  a  contract  which  encourages  investment.
Lacking such encouragement, the higher  interest rates  and lower
loan volumes will discourage investment.
Finally, the unenforceability problem can explaip a puzzle  in
this market.  In general, in any credit market, we would expect
borrowers to borrow when income is low, and repay the loans when
income  is high.  Given  declining  indirect  marginal  utility  of
funds, any  other  result  seems highly  suspicious.  However,  the
developing country debt market does not appear to work this way.17
Indeed, the major criticism of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)  is the
fact that the model assumes countries borrow in bad times and repay
in good times.  In fact, as Bulow and Rogoff  (1986)  and Gersovitz
(1985) point out, countries do the exact opposite --  they borrow
when income is high and pay it back when income is low.  Why?  The
Atkeson (1988)  story provides one possible answer --  contracts are
structured this way to encourage investment.  However, as discussed
above, it is not clear that the Atkeson argument is applicable to
a world with multiple investment opportunities for borrowers.
I would argue that there  is a more  fundamental cause of this
perverse  timing  of  credit  flows,  based  directly  on  the
unenforceability problem.
As Eichengreen and Portes (1986)  point out in their analysis of
the  developing  country debt  and default problem  of the  1930's,
those countries who defaulted tended to be those who were hardest
hit by declines in terms of trade and with greatest debt-service
burdens relative to their income (and  with most expansionary fiscal
policies).  Default risk  is clearly higher  in and following low
income periods  --  the welfare  benefits  of  repudiation  increase
while the costs decline with declining trade.  This is particularly
true if there is any persistence in income shocks --  if a decline
in income today lowers expected future income.
As  both  the  Stiglitz-Weiss  (1981) and  Jaffee-Russell  (1976)
models  show  clearly,  an  increase  in  risk  tends  to  reduce  the
optimal  loan  size.  If  countries  are  already  at  or  above  the
creditors'  perspective  of  optimal  loan  size,  as  a  result  of18
declining  income,  the  creditors  may  insist  on  net  repayment. 9
While  declining  income  makes  borrowers  wish  to  borrow  more,
concerns  related  to  potential  repudiation  prevent  lenders  from
satisfying those wishes.  As Eaton and Gersovitz (1980)  point out,
most developing countries are credit-constrained, in  the sense that
they would like to borrow more at existing rates of interest than
they are able to; those that are not credit-constrained have strong
export  performance  (i.e. they  are  not  suffering  from  serious
negative shocks to income).  And these credit-rationed borrowers
cannot  get  additional  funds by  offering higher  interest  rates.
Thus  the  perverse  timing  of  the  flow  of  credit  to  developing
countries  --  timing  which  aggravates  the effects  of income  swings  -
- is a direct result of the unenforceability problem.
Thus unenforceability  reduces loan volume, increases  interest
rates, reduces  investment in the borrowing  country, reduces the
term of loans, reverses the timing of credit flows and reduces the
utility of the borrowing country.  All of these results are proven
formally in the Appendix.  In particular,  I demonstrate  in the
Appendix that the decline in borrower utility stems both  from a
decline  in  expected  consumption  and  from  an  increase  in  the
variance  of  consumption.  Let  us  now  consider  the  effect  of
information asymmetries.
9Obviously,  demands  for  net  repayment  are  unenforceable.
Thus, creditors must be careful not to call  for a net repayment
large  enough  to  make  it  in the  country's  interest  to  default
immediately, even if such a net repayment is consistent with the
terms of the loan contract.19
III.  INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
There are three types of information about which asymmetry may
potentially be important:  information regarding ability to pay,
regarding susceptibility to penalties and willingness to pay, and
regarding use of loan proceeds.  It is helpful to consider each of
these  types of information separately.  First, however, we must
clarify the distinction between ability to pay and willingness to
pay.
What is  meant in this paper by "ability to pay" is simply  whether
the country has sufficient resources to pay the loan, if it chooses
to liquidate those resources.  In this sense, a country may have
the ability to pay its debts, but the government of that country
may simultaneously be unable to pay the debts because political
sentiment would not allow the liquidation of resources necessary
to pay the loan. 10 For the purposes of this analysis, this latter
problem would be classified as a willingness to pay problem.  This
distinction  separates  resource  availability  questions  from
questions  of  domestic  attitude  towards  the  debt  and  domestic
resources.
III.a. Information About Ability to Pay
Often a creditor's major concern is the debtor's ability to pay
l°For  example, it has been argued that Ecuador can and should
sell its oil reserves to pay its foreign debt.  The politics of
such a policy proposal are clearly at least as important as the
economics.  For  countries  lacking  a  substantial  reserve  of  a
readily marketable commodity like oil, this argument presumes they
nonetheless have internationally marketable assets.20
the  loan.  This  is  logical;  since  most  debt  contracts  are
enforceable, as long as the debtor has sufficient assets to repay
the loan, the creditor will get paid.
In the market  for developing  coulitry  debt,  ability to pay  is
generally  not  a  significant  issue.  As  Eaton,  Gersovitz  and
Stiglitz  (1986) point  out,  countries  are likely  always  to have
sufficient resources to pay the loan.  Whether they are willing to
liquidate assets or do whatever else is necessary to generate the
funds to pay the loan is a separate question; if they choose to pay
the loan, they have the resources to do so.  Thus,  in general,
asymmetries of information  regarding ability to  pay are irrelevant.
There are two important qualifications to this statement.
First,  Gale  and Hellwig  (1985) show that, when  there  are  costs
for the  lender  to  observe the  borrower's  situation,  asymmetric
information regarding ability to pay guarantees that the standard
debt contract is the optimal arrangement.  Debt is preferable to
equity in this situation because, with a  debt contract, observation
costs need only be incurred when the borrower claims an inability
to pay the debt.  With an equity contract, the observation costs
must be incurred each period in order for the investor to be sure
he is  getting the appropriate payment.  Thus asymmetric information
about ability to pay helps explain the preponderance of debt, as
opposed to equity, in LDC finance.
Second,  Diwan  (1987)  shows  that  a  fully  state-contingent
contract  will  maximize  loan  size.  He  cites  the  Mexican  1986
renegotiations, which made IMF loan size contingent upon the price21
of  oil,  as  a  movement  towards  state-contingent  contracts.
Unfortunately,  as  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1986)  point  out,  fully
contingent contracts are not possible, since they would have to be
contingent upon private information.
The implications of this information asymmetry are in general
difficult to discern.  Diwan proves, however, that  loan size is
lower  due  to  the  lender's  inability to  write  fully  contingent
contracts.
III.b.  Information Regard.ng Willingness to Pay
III.b.l  The Nature of the Problem
Since countries must choose to pay this unenforceable debt, the
information of  most relevance to creditors is information regarding
susceptibility to penalties and willingness to pay.  However, it
is  virtually  impossible  to  accurately  assess  a  country's
willingness to pay.
Willingness to pay (and  susceptibility to penalties) depends on
a whole host of factors --  economic, political and sociological.
Economic factors of relevance include a country's current economic
situation,  the importance of trade, the net indebtedness of the
country, interest rates, and the movement of all these factors in
coming years.  As Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) point out,
these  factors should  not be a source of asymmetric  information,
since  outside  lenders  are  generally  as  well  informed  about  a
country's economic prospects as domestic politicians.
Political  and  sociological  influences may  be  much  harder  to22
assess,  and  equally,  if  not  more,  important.  The  nature  of
political pressures for reform and the attitudes of the nation's
people and its leaders towards the debt clearly affect willingness
to pay, yet the effect is hard to quantify.
As a  result, we simply  lack the ability to accurately  assess
this  risk.  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1982) point  out  that,  while
lenders have developed statistical models to attempt to evaluate
the safety of loans to particular countries, the models  ir2  not
based on an accurate understanding of country risk.  The ir-,estors
can hardly be faulted for this failure; Guesnerie (1986)  points out
that  contract  theory  provides  us  with  no  model  capable  of
explaining this risk.
This  inability to  assess  adequately  the  risk of  these  loans
contributed to what many now believe to be the overlending prior
to 1982.  Guttentag and Herring  (1984) argue that banks  lent so
much because they perceived the risk and covariance of such loans
to be low; they were supported in this;  belief by economists.  Eaton
and  Gersovitz  (1981)  and  Goodman  (1981)  both  argued  that
diversifying  loan portfolios across  LDC's was a valid  approach,
since  according  to  Goodman,  common  risk  is  small  re?..ive  to
country risk, or according to Eaton and Gersovitz  (1981), export
performance across LDC's tends to be uncorrelated.
The experience of the 1980's  demonstrates clearly the weaknesses
in  these  arguments.  The  politics  of  trade  and/or  developing
country  recessions  can  effect  all  LDC's  simultaneously;  major
shocks  like the oil price changes of the 1970's  and  1980's can23
adversely  effect  large  numbers  of  borrowers  simultaneously;
renegotiation  with  one  country  increases  pressures  for
renegotiation with other countries.
We are not much better able to assess risk today then we were 10
years ago.  As Guttentag and Herring (1984)  point out, changes make
estimates of risk based  on past experience unreliable.  Lacking
theoretical models which are completely and accurately articulated,
to help us explain the process of deciding whether to default or
repay, we simply cannot accurately assess the risk of loans to any
particular country.
III.b.2.  The Impact on Loan Participants and the Loan Contract
Creditors in this market face both Knightian risk and Knightian
uncertainty.  There  is some probability  of default; this  is the
risk.  Creditors price the loans so as to compensate themselves for
taking on this risk.  To this extent, the market  for developing
country debt is similar to the market for most forms of debt; there
is almost always some risk, which lenders have to be enticed to
accept.
The uncertainty, however, complicates both the lender's decision
and  our  analysis.  The  uncertainty  stems  from  the  lender's
inability to accurately discern willingness  to pay and therefore
probability of default.  With lenders lacking accurate information
regarding  default  probability,  and  knowing  they  lack  such
information,  our  analysis  of  this  mdrket  is  confronted  with
uncertainty as well.24
What are the impacts  on this market of the asymmetric information
regarding willingness  to pay and therefore  default probability?
That depends on whether lenders act on the basis of an estimated
default probability which is greater or less than the true default
probability.
If they overestimate the risk involved, interest rates will be
too  high,  loan  quantities  too  low,  and  investment  and  general
economic activity in the borrowing country will be depressL-1. If
they underestimate the risk, the opposite will occur.
Guttentag  and  Herring  (1984) argue  that  banks  will  in  fact
underestimate  the risk.  Since banks have no accurate basis for
assessing  risk,  Guttentag  and  Herring  argue  they  must  make
subjective  estimates  of the risk.  Analyzing  the  psychology  of
making such subjective estimates, they argue that disaster myopia,
miscalculations and government guarantees will make lenders act as
if there is virtually no risk involved in these loans.
If risk is overestimated, the equilibrium will be suboptimal.
If  lenders overestimate  the  risk,  the  high  rates  will  prevent
profitable  (at rates which accurately reflect risks)  investments
from being undertaken.
If  lenders  underestimate  the  risk,  Pareto  comparisons  are
difficult  to make.  While  investments will be financed on which
true expected return to the lender is below his opportunity cost
of  funds, the expected return to the project itself exceeds this
opportunity  cost.  Borrowers are better  off due to the lender's
error,  the  lender  is  worse  off,  and  there  may  be  no  Pareto25
improving trades possible.
III.c.  Information About Use of the Loan Proceeds
III.c.l.  The Nature of the Problem
Creditors are often concerned about what borrowers do with the
borrowed  funds, since that can have a  substantial  impact on the
borrower's ability to pay the loan.  In the market for developing
country debt, creditors are concerned about the borrower's use of
the loan proceeds since that may have a substantial impact on the
borrower's willingness to pay the loan.
According to Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986),  while concern
for solvency should not cause creditors to be concerned about the
use of the funds, they should care nonetheless about the use the
funds are put to (and about other activities of the country after
the loan is granted).  The actions of the country can conceivably
affect susceptibility to penalties or the likelihood of imposition
of penalties, and by so doing effect the probability of repayment.
III.c.2.  The Impact on Loan Participants and the Loan Contract
Ideally, creditors would like the option of making  loans which
constrained borrower behavior.  Then borrowers and lenders could
agree  on a  set of borrower behaviors  that they would  both  find
desirable.  However,  as Krugman  (1985) points  out,  there  is no
possibility of effective and credible precommitruent.  Even  if a
contract was reached  which constrained borrower behavior, it would
suffer  from  the  same  unenforceability  problems  as  the  general26
contract.  And  since  creditors  are  concerned  about  borrower
behavior  in so  far as  it affects willingness  to adhere  to the
unenforceable contract, such unenforceable precommitments would be
of no benefit.
Without constraints on borrower behavior after the loan is made,
lenders  can  be  confident  borrowers  will  act  in their  own  self
interest.  This may involve borrowers taking actions which reduce
their willingness  to pay.  This  aggravates the unenforceability
problem,  and has  all the effects  on the  loan  contract  and the
participants  that  unenforceability  itself  has:  lower  loan
quantities,  higher  interest  rates,  shorter  maturities,  lower
investment, a perverse timing of credit  flows and  lower general
utility.
Indeed, the discussion of the Atkeson (1988)  argument for timing
credit flows  to influence investment levels  was focussing precisely
on the issue of the use of loan proceeds as it affects willingness
to pay.  And the Kletzer  (1986) argument for shorter maturities
similarly  focused  on  attempts  to  influence  the  use  of  loan
proceeds.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The  problems  of  unenforceable  contracts  and  asymmetric
information unambiguously result in a Pareto inferior equilibrium.
Investments  which  pay  expected or even  certain rates  of  return
greater than the opportunity cost of funds to creditors  are not
being undertaken,  while  investment projects with  lower rates of27
return  are being  financed elsewhere with  enforceable  contracts.
All parties to the loan contract, as well as anyone else interested
in the  economic  well-being  of these  debtor  countries  or  their
creditors, could be made better off if some method could be found
to make the contracts enforceable, and to increase the quantity and
quality of information the creditors receive.
It is important that we deal with the immediate crisis of the
1980's, and do so in ways that are do not adversely affect the
future functioning of this market.  But we should at the same time
be attempting to improve the market.
While  there  is no way  to make  the  contracts  in this  market
strictly  enforceable,  barring  the  improbable  creation  of  some
international  court  whose  judgments  will  be  supported  by  an
international army,  it should certainly be possible to  increase
the incentives for the developing countries to repay future loans.
Specifically, if  we could find  ways to increase the penalties for
default, or make the penalties more certain, this would increase
willingness to pay, to the benefit of all parties.
Further, we  should  be  looking  for  ways  to use  the  existing
multinational and international organizations to increase the flow
of information relevant to these contracts.
Finally, a little creativity, combined with increased penalties
for default, may enable us to increase the extent of precommitment
regarding the use of funds.  Extensive use is already made of IMF
contingency  programs  as  a  way  of  establishing  some  form  of
precommitment.  Further use of international organizations along28
these lines  may be possible, allowing mutually beneficial contracts
to be written which are currently not possible due to a  lack of
enforceability regarding precommitments.29
APPENDIX
The purpose of this Appendix  is to demonstrate mathematically
that  the  claims  made  above,  regarding  the  effects  of
unenforceability  and asymmetric information, are accurate.  Thus
I describe,  not a  realistic model  of the market  for developing
country debt, but a simple credit market capable of demonstrating
the  effects  of  these  problems.  Each  result  is  proven  in  the
simplest model possible, for greatest clarity of exposition.  It
is easy to show that all results hold in the most general of the
models presented.
I  begin  by  describing  the  enforceable,  complete  information
version of the model.  The economy under consideration is a simple
two period economy.  The market consists of two types of agents:
borrowers and lenders.  Borrowers choose consumption, investment
and loans to maximize utility.  Specifically, borrowers solve
Maximize  U(C 1 IC 2)
L, I  Subject to:  C1 < Y1 + L - I
C2 < Y2 +  F(I)  - RL
where  Ci is consumption  in the i""  period, Yi is exogenous income
in the ith  period, L is loan size, I investment, R the gross rate
of  interest  paid  on  loans,  F()  and  U(, )  the  production  and
utility functions, respectively.  Both F()  and U(,  ) are assumed
to have  positive  first and negative second partial derivatives,
with  the  first derivative  evaluated  at  zero equal  to  infinity.
Finally, to simplify the analysis of the unenforceable version of30
the model, U(,  ) is assumed additively separable in its arguments
Lenders are assumed to  be risk neutral, to have a source of funds
available to them at rate RD, and to have two loan options:  a
perfectly  safe bond,  B, paying  the  exogenous rates  R' >  1, and
loans to the borrower.  Lenders allocate the funds available to
them  across  bonds  and  loans,  in  a  way  which  maximizes  their
expected income.  It is assumed that supplies and demands are such
that lenders hold both bonds and loans in  equilibrium; this implies
that R must be equal to R.
Letting Ui denote the first derivative of utility with respect
to  Ci, and  F'  denote  the  first  derivative  of  the  production
function, the borrower's prob'lem  implies both
1)  U1'/U 2'  =  R  (=  R)  and
2)  U,./U 2 =  F'
This assumes R' >/ F' when L =  0, so borrowers do take out loans.
Equations  1) and 2) describe the equilibrium  in this market.
Borrowers invest up to the point where F' =  R 8, and they borrow an
amount sufficient to make the ratio of the marginal utilities of
consumption also equal to R.
Let me now make the contract unenforceable.  Instead of  borrowers
automatically paying of  f the loan, they pay off the loan if and
only  if it is in their interest to do so.  Specifically,  it is
assumed that if borrowers default on their loan in period 2, they
incur a  penalty P 2, where P2 is the realization of a random variable
p, with density functiun  g(p) defined on the closed interval t0,P].
P2 is observed at the start of period  2, prior to the borrower's31
decision to pay back the loan or default.
The borrower's problem is now the following:
Maximize  E(U(C 1,C2))
L, I  Subject to:  C1 < Y1 +  L - I
C 2 <  Max  (Y2+F(I)-RL, Y 2 +F(I)-P 2)
Clearly the borrower will default whenever P 2 <  RL.
The risk neutral lender will now make these loans only if they
pay an expected rate of return equal to R8. Thus R must satisfy
p
3) R f  g(p)dp =  R.
p=RL
several facts are immediately obvious from equation 3).  First,
since the integral of g(p) from RL to P is < 1, and strictly less
than  1  if  RL  >  O,  R  >  R',  which  demonstrates  that  the
unenforceability  increases  the  interest  rate  on  these  loans.
Second, since the default probability is increasing in L, or more
precisely  the  set  of states  in which  the borrower  defaults  is
increasing in L, the interest rate is also increasing in L."
"lActually,  it is technically possible that R is decreasing in
L.  The sign of dR/dL is the same as the sign of
p
- RLg(RL) +  fg(p)dp.  We restrict our attention in this Appendix
p=RL
to those density functions g()  for which this is positive.  This
is not a severe restriction on oor model.  If, for example, g()
was the uniform density function, this formula would become
(P-2RL)/P, which is positive as long as RL <  P/2.  If, however, RL
>  P/2,  that  would  imply  a  loan  on  which  the  borrower  chooses
default over  half the time; this  is hardly  realistic.  So, for
reasonable  density functions and parameters of the model,  it is
safe to assume dR/dL >  O.32
Returning to the borrower, we can now specify his problem as
RL
Maximize  Ui(Yi + L - I) + f  U2(Y2 + F(I)  - P2)g(p)dp  +
L, I  p=O
p
f  U2(Y 2 + F(I) - RL)g(p)dp
p=RL
Solving this problem, and letting U'2n  be the derivative of utility
with  respect to  C2 in those  states  when  the  borrower  does  not
default, we find
4)  U 1/U  2n  =  F' and
p
5) U JU 2  =  (R + L(aR/OL)) fg(p)dp
p=RL
Note  that  3) and  5) together  imply that  the  ratio  of marginal
utility of consumption in period 1 relacive to period 2 is greater
than Rs, implying that C 1 has increased and/or C 2 has decreased (in
the nondefault states).' Further, since F' is also greater than RS,
it  is  clear  that  I  has  declined  relative  to  the  model  with
enforceability.
What can we say about loan volume, L?  We know that either C 1
has decreased or that C 2 (when the borrower does not default) has
increased,  or  both.  For  C1 =  Y1 +  L  - I  to  decrease  when  I
decreases  requires  L  to  decline.  For  C2 =  Y2 +  F(I)  - RL  to
increase when  I  decreases  and  R  increases  also  requires  L  to33
decline.  So L is clearly lower than in the enforceable case.
Further,  since  "growth"  in  this  model  stems  solely  from
investment, the decline in investment means a decline in growth.
Finally, can we say anything about the utility of the borrower?
Expected consumption across the two periods, in both models, is Y 1
+  Y2 + F(I) - (Rs-l)L,  since in both cases the expected payment to
the lender is R,L.  While I is lower in the unenforceable case, L
is also.  We  know  from  above  that  F(I)  - RL  is lower  in the
unenforceable case than in the enforceable case, so F(I) - (RS-l)L
is as well.  Thus total consumption across the two periods is also
lower.
The unenforceability has increased the variance of second period
consumption  (from zero  to some positive  number)  while  lowering
total consumption, making the risk averse borrower unambiguously
worse  off.  Even  if the borrower were risk neutral, or slightly
risk loving, he would be worse off.
This proves the assertions made in  the text that unenforceability
increases interest rates, reduces loan size, reduces investment,
reduces growth  of the borrowing country  and  in general  reduces
utility.  12  To  prove  the  assertions  regarding  maturity  and  the
timing of credit flows requires a slightly more complex version of
12It  is  easy  to  see  that  an  increase  in  penalties  would
increase borrower utility in this model.  An increase in default
cost P in all states of the world would make possible a reduction
in R, an increase in L, and an increase in I.  Consumption would
be less variable, and expected consumption would increase.  In the
extreme, a  sufficiently high  default cost  in all states  of the
world would effectively duplicate the enforceable version of the
model.34
the model.
To deal with the question of the maturity of the loan contract,
I  must  extend  the  model  to  three  periods.  For  expositional
simplicity, I will describe a deterministic version of the model,
with no uncertainty.
First let us consider the borrower, when there are no loans made.
The borrower  lives  for three periods,  and attempts  to maximize
utility of consumption across those three periods.  The borrower
has access to income Y, a one-period savings technology and a two-
period investment opportunity.  Specifically, the borrower solves
Maximize  U(C 1 1C2 1C3)
5, I  Subject  to:  C1 <  Y - S  - I
C 2 <  S
C3 <  F(I)
The solution to the borrower's problem involves S  and I such that
Ul/U2  =  1 and U1'/U3' =  F'.
Introducing loans to the model, the borrower's problem becomes
Maximize  U(C 1 1 C21 C3)
Subject  to:  C1 <  Y - S - I +  L
C2 <  S
C3 C  F(I) - RL
Note that with R >  1, it can never be optimal to borrow in period
1 to finance savings for period 2 consumption,  so all loans are
used to finance investment.  Assuming that Ft >  R when there are
no loans made, so that loans are undertaken, the solution to the
borrower's  problem  involves  S,  I  and  L  such  that  U1'/U 2'  =  1,35
Ul'/U3'=  F'  and  F'  =  R.  The  loans  facilitate  additional
investment, and additional consumption in all periods.
I  now  introduce unenforceability  into the model.  Again,  as
before, borrowers pay off the loan only if it is in their interest
to do so.  However, I now assume that borrowers can choose between
two investment  technologies, and the choice  effects the penalty
they  incur  for  defaulting.  Specifically,  if  they  invest  in
technology g  (for "good"), the penalty for default is some known
high  level  P.  If they  invest in technology b  (for "bad"), the
penalty  for  default  is  0.13  Borrowers  can  invest  in  only  one
technology,  and  the  return  to  their  investment  is  identical
regardless  of  the  chosen  technology,  except  for  its  impact  on
default cost.
It  is relatively easy to show that all the effects described
earlier --  higher  interest rates,  lower loans,  lower  investment
and lower utility --  will result from the unenforceability.  What
happens to the maturity structure?  With enforceability, all loans
are two period loans.  Let us consider whether two period loans are
possible with unenforceability.
Lenders would obviously like borrowers to invest in technology
g.  But, just as the loan itself is unenforceable, there is no way
for  the  lender  to  force  investment  in  a  particular  type  of
technology.  It will be optimal, from the borrower's perspective,
13Actually, any default penalty less than P, and less than the
R times the desired loan amount, is sufficient for the claims that
follow.36
for the borrower take the loan, invest  in technology b, and default
on the loan.
Knowing this, lenders will not make any loans.  And borrowers
cannot  effectively  commit  to  invest  in  technology  g;  lacking
enforcement powers, the lender knows that any such promises will
be violated by the borrower as soon as the loan is made.  So there
will be no two period loans.
It is pos6ible to use a sequence of one period loans to resolve
this problem.  Suppose the lender offered to make a loan, due in
period  2, and agreed to renew the loan in period  2 provided the
loan proceeds had been invested in  technology g.  Let us assume the
cost of default in  period 2 is  exogenously P; that is, any attempts
to reduce the cost of default do not succeed until period 3.  How
would the borrower respond?  He has three options.
The borrower could accept the offer and invest in technology g.
Assuming P is greater than RL, this effectively returns us to the
enforceable case.
The borrower could reject the offer.  But this would be optimal
only if L =  0 was optimal in the enforceable case, and we assumed
this was not the situation.  So the borrower will not reject the
offer.
Finally,  the  borrower  could  accept  the  offer  and  invest  in
technology b.  In this case the loan would have to be paid back in
period  2.  Effectively the loan would have been used to finance
savings, which paid a return 1 <  R.  It can never be optimal to
borrow funds at a cost greater than the return one gets from the37
use of those funds, so borrowers will not choose this option.
Thus the sequence of one period loans will be undertaken.  As
argued  in the body  of the paper, maturity  of the loans will be
reduced, in order to influence borrower behavior, as a result of
the unenforceability.
The final claim in the body of the paper, regarding the effects
of unenforceability, is its impact on the timing of loans.  I will
now prove that unenforceability can result in credit flowing into
the borrowing country during high income periods, and out during
low income periods.
Consider the following variant on the mode: of this Appendix.
Borrowers, concerned about ma>imizing utility of consumption over
three periods, have income in the first period and access to one-
period investment technology.  They borrow in the first period to
finance consumption and/or investment, pay these loans back in the
second period and borrow again.  Specifically, they solve
Maximize  E(U(C 1,C 2 ,C 3 ))
-IlII2,  Ll,  L2
Subject  to;  C1 =  Y  - I,  -L
C2 =  F1(I,)  - I2 + L2 - R1L,
C3 =  max(F 2 (I 2 )  - R2L2 ;  F2 (I 2 )  - P)
Note  that  borrowers  pay in the third period only if it is in their
interest to do so.14 Fi() is random, in  the  following  way;  Fi((I)
14Conceivably  the model could  include the option  of default
in the second period as well.  However, since there would be no
uncertainty  regarding  second  period  default  costs,  banks  would
never lend  so much as to make  second  period  default  optimal;  all
this  would  add  to the  model  is that borrowers might  be credit-38
=  (ai  +  ei)Ii7,  where ei is a random number with E(e 1 ) =  0, and ai
=  a,-.  +  .5(ei).  Thus  there  is  persistence  in the  shocks  to
productivity.  Income in period 2 greater than expected results in
increased expected period 3 income.
Finally, P is assumed to be an increasing function of output in
period  3.  This is not an unreasonable assumption; the penalties
that  exist  for  developing  countries  who  default  tend  to  be
penalties  on trade.  In general, trade  is more  important to  a
developing country, and thus the potential penalties more severe,
the greater is income.
It is easy to demonstrate that desired loans L2 are decreasing
in shocks to income; that is, a negative shock to income in period
2 increases loan demand in period 2.15 Thus, in absence of credit
constraints,  credit  flows in the usual  manner:  the greater  is
borrower  income  in  period  2,  the  lower  are  net  loans  to  the
borrower.  Embedded in a model with a greater number of periods,
net borrowing would tend to be positive when income was low, and
negative when income was high.
But I have argued above that the unenforceability of contracts
results in credit constraints, and I have shown that credit flows
tend to be the opposite of that just described.  I now will use the
model to explain this latter fact.
constrained  in period  1.  This would  not effect our conclusions
regarding timing of credit flows.
"5If  the shocks  were perfectly persistent,  it would  not be
clear that loan demand increased when there was a negative income
shock.39
If borrcw'-s are credit-constrained, in the sense of Stiglitz-
Weiss  (1981)  or  Jaffee-Russell  (1976)  or  Eaton  and  Gersovitz
(1980),  they are borrowing, not as much as they desire at existing
interest rates, but as much as lenders will provide.  When there
is  a  negative  shock  to  income  in  period  2,  that  reduces  the
expected value of P, the cost for defaulting, in period 3.  Knowing
this, lenders will reduce the volume of loans they are willing to
make.
Thus, when income is unexpect dly low in period 2, loan volume
will decline.  In a many-period model, credit will flow into the
country when  income is high, and out when  income  is low --  the
opposite of borrower's wishes.
This completes the proof of claims regarding the effect of the
unenforceability  of the contracts.  I now turn to the effect of
asymmetric information.
Recall  from above  my  argument  that  since  solvency  is not  a
problem, asymmetric information regarding ability to pay is not a
problem.  Asymmetric information regarding use of  the loan proceeds
matters in that it effects the enforceability of the contract; the
effects of this wrere  demonstrated above, particularly with xespect
to the maturity of the loan contracts.  So all that remains is to
demonstrate  the  effect  of  asymmetric  information  regarding
willingness to pay.
Let  us  returrn  to  the  earliest  specification  of  the  model,
discussed above.  With P 2 distributed according to density function
g(p),  let  the  lenders  incorrectly  assume  it  is  distributed40
according  to  density  function  G(p).16  Equation  3)  would  then
include G(p), instead of g(p).  Depending upon the differences in
these two functions, R might increase or decrease.
If  G  is  such  that  lenders  underestimate  susceptibility  to
penalties, R will be higher as a result.  It is easy to see that
this would reduce L, I, growth and borrower utility.  If lenders
overestimate the  susceptibility to penalties,  the opposite will
occur.
Finally, we cannot be certain as to the welfare effects of an
overestimate of susceptibility to penalties.  Clearly the lender
is worse off while the borrower is better off due to this error,
but with riskless I and a lower bound to R of Rs, it is not clear
that a Pareto improving allocation exists.
It  is clear,  however,  that  loan contracts  based  on  lenders'
underestimate of susceptibility to penalties result  in a  Pareto
inferior equilibrium; the opportunity cost of funds is less than
the  expected return  on  investment projects  which  are not  being
financed.  Thus it is theoretically possible to reallocate funds
in a way that improve's everyone's utility.
16I  will  assume  lenders act as if G(p)  is the true density
function; even if  they know it is not the correct density function,
it summarizes all information they do have.41
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